Who Can Change This Constitution

After the security clauses, a key appears on the table.

Someone reaches out to grab it, saying:

Since Parliament represents the people, of course Parliament can change the Constitution.

Another person holds their hand down.

He says:

Yes.

But count carefully first, there is not just one key on the table.

It is a bunch of keys.

The Constitution is Not a Stone Tablet#

If the Constitution were entirely unchangeable, it would become a stone tablet.

Stone tablets are solemn.

But a nation is not a stone tablet.

The population will change.

State relations will change.

The court system will change.

The electoral system will change.

In 1957, there was no Sabah and Sarawak.

After 1963, the word "Malaysia" itself carried a new layer of political reality compared to "Malaya."^1,3

Therefore, the Constitution must be amendable.

The first sentence of Article 159 broadly states: Subject to the following provisions of this Article and to Article 161E, the provisions of this Constitution may be amended by federal law.^1,3

The door is open.

But there are doors behind the door.

The First Door: Not an Ordinary Majority#

An ordinary law can be passed by a simple majority.

But a constitutional amendment is not an ordinary law.

Article 159(3) states that generally, a Bill for making any amendment to the Constitution shall not be passed in either House of Parliament unless it has been supported on Second and Third Readings by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of members of that House.^1,3

Notice, it is the total number of members.

Not just the people sitting inside that day.

Nor the ones shouting the loudest.

This elevates constitutional amendment one level above daily politics.

A government can govern.

But governing does not mean it can arbitrarily rewrite the skeleton of the nation.

It must prove that it has a thicker majority.

Not just winning a single vote.

But winning enough to move the Constitution.

The Second Door: Some Small Doors are Lighter#

However, Article 159 does not lock all amendments with the same weight.

Article 159(4) lists some exceptions.

Certain technical amendments to Schedules, certain incidental or consequential amendments arising from other constitutional authorizations, and certain amendments related to the admission of a new State to the Federation do not necessarily fall under the two-thirds threshold.^1,3

This sounds dry.

But it illustrates a principle:

The Constitution has main beams, and it has door nails.

Main beams cannot be moved casually.

If every door nail required the heaviest procedure to be moved, the nation would tie itself up.

So the amendment system is not a single lock.

It is a tiered locking system.

The Third Door: The Conference of Rulers#

Then, the most sensitive door appears.

Article 159(5) states that any amendment to certain specified provisions cannot be passed without the consent of the Conference of Rulers. The scope includes Article 10(4) and related laws, Part III (Citizenship), Article 38, Article 63(4), Article 70, Article 71(1), Article 72(4), Article 152, Article 153, and Article 159(5) itself.^1,3

There are familiar shadows in here.

Citizenship.

Language.

The Conference of Rulers.

Parliamentary privilege.

Article 153.

These are the exact issues that have been discussed in the previous chapters.

These are not ordinary policies.

They are the parts of the independence constitutional compromise most prone to overheating.

So the Constitution says: Even if Parliament has the numbers, some doors cannot be opened by Parliament alone.^1,2

The key must pass through the Conference of Rulers.

Why Even 159(5) Itself is Locked#

Here lies a small mechanism straight out of a suspense novel.

Article 159(5) does not only lock others.

It also locks itself.

That is to say, if someone wants to change the rule of "which matters require the consent of the Conference of Rulers," that very change also requires the consent of the Conference of Rulers.^1,3

It is like putting the key to a safe inside another safe.

Otherwise, what would happen?

A government with a two-thirds majority could theoretically remove the consent door first, and then go back to amend the originally protected matters.

Article 159(5) blocks this shortcut.

It doesn't let you pick the lock first before opening the door.

The Fourth Door: The East Malaysia Key that Appeared Later#

Up to this point, if we are still in 1957, the story only applies to Malaya.

But the nation did not stop there.

In 1963, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore joined, and Malaysia was formed.

Singapore later left.

Sabah and Sarawak remained.

Thus, a door related to Article 161E was added to the Constitution.

Article 161E states that if a constitutional amendment affects certain constitutional arrangements of Sabah or Sarawak—such as citizenship connections to the State, the constitution and jurisdiction of the High Court, state legislative and executive powers, financial arrangements, religion in the State, language use, and the special treatment of natives—it requires the concurrence of the Yang di-Pertua Negeri of the State concerned.^1,3

This was not an original issue on the negotiation table in 1957.

But it reminds us:

Malaysia's Constitution later was not just adding a name to the skeleton of Malaya.

It also added new locks.

Behind the new locks were new political promises.

Does More Locks Mean More Democracy?#

The answer is not that simple.

If there are too few locks, the Constitution will be dragged along by temporary majorities.

Two-thirds today, it gets changed today.

Two-thirds tomorrow, it gets changed again tomorrow.

The people just get used to one system, and the system changes its face again.

But if there are too many locks, the Constitution can also become stiff.

Society has changed, but the text refuses to give way.

The people send a new majority through the ballot box, only for the new majority to find that the real doors are elsewhere.

So there is always a fine line in the amendment system:

It must allow the nation to grow up.

Yet it must prevent the nation from recklessly altering itself beyond recognition.

After the 1970s, the Keys Became Heavier#

Later, Malaysia experienced the 1969 general elections, the May 13 incident, the Emergency, the suspension of Parliament, and the National Operations Council (MAGERAN).

By 1971, the Constitution underwent significant amendments.

Secondary research usually discusses that round of amendments together with speech restrictions on "sensitive matters," the scope of Article 153, and the expansion of the consent requirement in Article 159(5).^4,1

We cannot write about this too quickly here.

Because 1971 is not the main focus of this article.

But it illustrates one thing:

The constitutional amendment process itself can become a battlefield for political struggle.

Who can change the Constitution?

How can it be changed?

Which topics are locked?

These are not technical questions.

They determine whether the future state can say certain things, touch certain clauses, or redistribute power.^4,1

How a Piece of Paper Protects Itself#

So now look back at Article 4.

It says the Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation, and any law passed after Merdeka Day which is inconsistent with it is void to the extent of the inconsistency.^1,3

This sentence sounds very authoritative.

But how does the supreme law protect itself?

By relying on the courts?

By relying on Parliament?

By relying on the Conference of Rulers?

By relying on the voters?

The answer is: all of them.

The courts interpret it.

Parliament can amend it within the thresholds.

The Conference of Rulers holds a consent door on certain sensitive matters.

Sabah and Sarawak later have their own protective structures in Article 161E.

And the voters decide who gets to sit in Parliament, and who has the chance to get that two-thirds key.^1,3

The Constitution protects itself not with a single sentence.

It relies on a set of mechanisms where powers pull on each other.

Evidence for This Article, Clearly Explained#

Explanations of Article 159, Article 161E, and Article 4 are based on the AGC Federal Constitution. The Constitute Project is only used as a reference for the 2025 compiled text and is not treated as an official version.^1,3

The 1957 drafting background serves only as a structural explanation. This article does not portray the Reid Commission as the sole source of the final amendment system; it is used here only to illustrate the political background of the compromises among the Federation, the Rulers, and the communities at that time.^2,1

Changes after 1971 act merely as a hint for the next phase. This article cites New Mandala for secondary narratives, reminding readers that the scope of Article 159(5) was tightened after later political crises. To write specifically about the 1971 amendments, a separate article must be opened, supplemented by primary bills, parliamentary records, and case law materials.^4,1

This article is sensitive: true. It touches on citizenship, language, Article 153, the Conference of Rulers, the status of Sabah and Sarawak, and amendment powers; the original draft was reviewed sentence by sentence by Jay before publication.

---

Next up: Amending the Constitution requires votes. Where do the votes come from? How does a ballot paper send ordinary people into the Dewan Rakyat, and how does it send a government to the door of the Constitution?